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Purpose: Despite significance of boards of directors, very 
few studies have examined their influences. This paper 
investigates the effect of board on corporate social 
responsibility reporting of quoted companies in Nigeria.  
Methodology: Although, the study is empirical, the 
research design is correlational in nature. Panel data of 
329 observations was extracted from 47 firms over 7 
years (2013-2019). The data was tested for descriptive 
analysis (mean, number of observations, standard 
deviations, minimum and maximum means, normality, 
multicollinearity, and heteroskedasticity. 
Findings: Results reveal that board size, diligence and 
independence failed to show significant effects. However, 
board gender diversity, firm size and leverage show 
significant effect. It also shows that social disclosure 
index is superior to corporate social responsibility 
disclosure model.  
Originality/Value: The paper concludes that female 
directors, firm size and debt are the key elements of 
corporate social responsibility reporting of quoted firms 
in Nigeria. Therefore, shareholders should appoint more 
women on the board. Management should increase firm 
size by acquiring additional assets and take advantage of 
cheap debt opportunities in the capital market. 
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Corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) is both good for the host 
communities and firms’ bottom lines. The motivation of this paper is CSRR has 
become of interest both to policy makers and the community leaders in recent times. 
Hence, there is need to investigate further the role of CSR in business. Corporations 
have realized that it is good for business to support or help the environment in which 
they do operate. Nigeria represents an interesting case as the country is largely led 
by the government sector, with very little contributions coming from the organized 
private sector. There is need, therefore to understand the contributions of the 
organized private sector and to investigate whether it is good for business to be 
engaged in it. 
CSR is a desirable goal well cherished by every stakeholders, including shareholders, 
creditors, employees, host communities, government at all levels and others. 
Perhaps, it is also true that some shareholders will prefer to receive higher dividends 
and capital gains than to part with returns on their investments. It is in the self-
enlightened interest of the greater majority of stakeholders that corporations give 
back to the society that has allowed them to flourish. It is also in the interest of 
generations to come that we leave the world better than we met it.  
Corporate social responsibility has received its own share of academic and policy 
controversies. While Carnegie (1889) in his treatise, the Gospel of Wealth, describes 
the responsibility of the rich to give back to society, the like of Friedman (1962), in 
his book, Capitalism and Freedom, discusses the limit of the role of economic 
capitalism in liberal society. Nevertheless, the world has moved greatly away to the 
middle of compromise and has accepted some form of responsibilities for modern 
corporations to bear part of the burden of providing for the society. 
It is instructive at this point to identify and understand factors that influence 
corporate social responsibility disclosure: board size, meeting, gender, 
independence, firm size and leverage. This study is useful to our understanding of 
concept, theory and empirics, and corporate governance mechanism and social 
responsibility. This paper fills in empirical, theoretical, conceptual, methodological 
and demographical gaps that exist in Nigeria. The study contributes to the body of 
knowledge that is available, clarify differences in understanding of theories, methods, 
and demographics. For example, researchers, students, managers, creditors, 
suppliers, community leaders, government at various tiers, regulatory authorities, 
and tax authorities may benefit from the paper. 
 




This study is predicted on the agency theory, which is a concept used to explain the 
association between principals (shareholders) and managers (agents) in order to 
resolve conflict. In the case, shareholders are the principal owners and managers are 
the agents. Xian et al. (2014) found board size to be positive and significant. Similarly, 
Martin and Herrero (2018) examined board of directors: Composition and effect on 
the performance of the firm they found board size to be significant. Also, Guerrero-
Villagas et al. (2018) board attributes and CSRR: Meta-analysis and found that board 
size to significant. Isa and Sabo (2015) found that board size is significant and 
positive. Naseem et al. (2019) also examined the impact of board characteristics on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure and found board size to be significant. 
Riyadh et al. (2019) also examined the effect of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure and board characteristics on corporate performance and found board size 
to be significant. Bello and Abdul-Manaf (2017) found it to be positive and significant. 
Abduh and Algeely (2015) investigated Islamic banks and concluded that board size 
had negative influence. Bulto (2011) and Jensen (1993) agreed that board size had 
negative influence. Therefore, in null form, this study predicts that: 
H0a: Board size has no significant effect. 
H1a: Board size has significant effect. 
Board diligence is the number of times a meeting takes place. Naseem et al. (2019) 
found board meeting to be significant. Harywaman et al. (2020) examined board 
meeting, loss and corporate social responsibility disclosure in Indonesia and found 
that meeting is negative but significant. Ahmad et al. (2017) examined board meeting 
frequency and corporate social responsibility disclosure: Evidence from Malaysia and 
found that board meeting is not significant. Bello and Abdul-Manaf (2017) examined 
board governance mechanisms and sustainability disclosure: A moderating role of 
intellectual capital and found it to be insignificant. Pantamee (2014) found it to be 
significant and negative. Therefore, in null form, this study opines that: 
H0b: Board diligence has no significant effect. 
H1b : Board diligence has significant effect. 
Isa and Sabo (2015) found that board gender is significant. Naseem et al. (2019) 
found board gender to be significant. Riyadh et al. (2019) also found board gender to 
be significant. Anazonwu et al. (2018) found board gender to be significant. Also, 
Yaroson and Giwa (2016) found it to be significant. Awodiran and Kareem (2019) 
found it significant. Abubakar (2016) found gender to be positive and significant. 
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Bello and Abdul-Manaf (2017) found it to be positive and significant. However, in null 
form, this study suggests that: 
H0c: Board gender has no significant effect. 
H1c: Board gender has significant effect. 
Board independence is the number of independent members on the board. Riyadh et 
al. (2019) found board independence not significant. Bansal et al. (2018) examined 
board independence and corporate social responsibility disclosure: The mediating 
role of the presence of family ownership and found that board independence is 
significant. Khan et al. (2013) examined impact of corporate governance on 
corporate social responsibility disclosures: Evidence from an emerging economy and 
found board independence to be significant and positive. However, Ebimobowei 
(2017) examined corporate governance and corporate social responsibility of listed 
companies in Nigeria and found board independence not significant. Anazonwu et al. 
(2018) also examined corporate board and found independence to be significant. 
Awodiran and Kareem (2019) found board independence to be negative and 
significant. Abubakar (2016) found independence of the board to be positive and 
significant. Bello and Abdul-Manaf (2017) found it to be positive and significant. 
H0d: Board independence has no significant effect. 
H1d: Board independence has significant effect. 
Research Methodology 
This section deals with methodology of the paper. Two models were adapted and 
tested based on Ahmed (2016) in his treatise corporate social responsibility 
disclosure and financial performance of quoted deposit money banks in Nigeria: 
sdixi,t = α + β1bsizi,t + β2bdili,t + β3bgdri,t + β4bind,t + β5fsizi,t + β6levi,t + εi,t ……(1) 
csrri,t = α + β1bsizi,t + β2bdili,t + β3bgdri,t + β4bind,t + β5fsizi,t + β6levi,t + εi,t ……(2) 
Whereas: 
sdix = Social disclosure index, measured by  (Ahmed, 2016). 
csrr = Corporate social responsibility disclosure, measured by its dummy, that is, 
presence of it 1, 0 otherwise (Ahmed, 2016). 
bsiz = Board size (Martin & Herrero, 2018; Xian et al., 2014; Yahaya & Tijjani, 2020). 
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bdil = Number of meetings (Harywaman et al., 2020; Naseem et al., 2019; Yahaya & 
Bilyaminu, 2020). 
bgdr = Board female members (Isa & Sabo, 2015; Naseem et al., 2019; Riyadh et al., 
2019; Yahaya & Bilyaminu, 2020; Yahaya & Awen, 2020). 
Bind = Board independence is the number of independent directors divided by total 
directors (Bansal et al., 2018; Ebimobowei, 2017; Khan et al., 2013). 
fsiz = Firm size (Eriki & Osifo, 2015; Sulub, 2014). 
levg = (Gadzo & Asiamah, 2018; Sulub, 2014). 
i = Firm word  
t = Year script  
α = Constant 
β1-6 = Beta coefficients  
ε = Error term.  
Findings and Discussion  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 





sdix 316 .682 .196 0 1 
csrr 316 .487 .501 0 1 
bsiz 316 9.177 2.902 0 19 
bdil 316 4.111 2.101 0 19 
bgdr 316 8.352 10.063 0 40 
bind 316 .619 .1726 0 .95 
fsiz 316 1.714 .849 -.449 3.775 
levg 316 .846 2.017 0 17.977 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
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As indicated in Table 1, the number of observations is very high 316; board size has 
the highest arithmetic mean 9.177 with standard deviation of 2.902 and minimum 
mean and maximum mean of 0 and 19, respectively. This is followed by board gender 
of 8.352 with standard deviation of 10.063 and minimum mean and maximum mean 
of 0 and 40, respectively. This followed by board diligence with mean of 4.111 with 
standard deviation of 2.101 The least is csrr of .487 with standard deviation of .501. 
Table 2 
Chen-Shapiro QH* test for normal data 
Variable Obs QH QH* P-value 
sdix 316 0.995 0.091 < 0.0001 
csrr 316 0.631 6.559 < 0.0001 
bsiz 316 1.011 -0.197 > 0.200 
bdil 316 0.901 1.755 < 0.0001 
bgdr 316 0.877 2.181 < 0.0001 
bind 316 1.011 -0.188 > 0.200 
fsiz 316 1.000 -0.003 >0.058 
levg 316 0.452 9.751 < 0.0001 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
From Table 2, board size, board independence and firm size are insignificant at 5%, 
meaning that they are normally distributed. The rests such as corporate social 
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Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
 
Table 3 results show absence of multicollinearity among the figures; while results in 
Table 4 confirms this statement.  
Table 4 
Results of Multicollinearity Diagnostic 
Variable Variance IF 1/Variance Inflation 
Factor 
Bsiz 1.71 0.585 
Fsiz 1.67 0.599 
Bind 1.23 0.813 
Levg 1.18 0.849 
Bdil 1.16 0.860 
Bgdr 1.05 0.951 
Mean VIF 1.33  
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
 











Cameron & Trivedi's breakdown of Information Matrix Check 
sdix 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 49.88 27 0.005 
Skewness 17.10 6 0.009 
Kurtosis 5.54 1 0.019 
Total 72.53 34 0.000 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
csrr 
Source chi2 Df p 
Heteroskedasticity 62.21 27 0.000 
Skewness 36.03 6 0.000 
Kurtosis 97.37 1 0.000 
Total 195.61 34 0.000 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
Table 5 shows that both models have heteroskedasticity problems with p-value less 
than .05. Therefore, Table 6 is robust because of this problem. 
Table 6 
logistic sdix bsiz bdil bgdr bind fsiz levg, robust 
sdix Odds Ratio Robust Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
bsiz .727 .144 -1.61 0.108 .493 1.072 
bdil .832 .116 -1.32 0.186 .634 1.092 
bgdr .930 .031 -2.17 0.030 .870 .993 
bind .485 .759 -0.46 0.644 .023 10.440 
fsiz 4.595 3.701 1.89 0.058 .948 22.278 
levg .455 .088 -4.07 0.000 .312 .666 
_cons 1481.759 2739.854 3.95 0.000 39.5238 55551.56 
Wald chi2(6)    =      63.98 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudo likelihood = -25.231358                 Pseudo R2       =     0.5055 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
 
From Table 6, it shows that board gender and leverage are significant and have 
positive effects on csrr. The research fails to find board size, meeting (diligence), 
independence and fsiz significant 
 










sdix 316 .682 .196 0 1 
csrr 316 .487 .501 0 1 
bsiz 316 9.177 2.902 0 19 
bdil 316 4.111 2.101 0 19 
bgdr 316 8.352 10.063 0 40 
bind 316 .619 .1726 0 .95 
fsiz 316 1.714 .849 -.449 3.775 
levg 316 .846 2.017 0 17.977 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
 
As indicated in Table 7, the number of observations is very high 316; board size has 
the highest arithmetic mean 9.177 with standard deviation of 2.902 and minimum 
mean and maximum mean of 0 and 19, respectively. This is followed by board gender 
of 8.352 with standard deviation of 10.063 and minimum mean and maximum mean 
of 0 and 40, respectively. This followed by board diligence with mean of 4.111 with 
standard deviation of 2.101 The least is csrr of .487 with standard deviation of .501. 
Table 8 
Chen-Shapiro QH* test for normal data 
Variable Obs QH QH* P-value 
sdix 316 0.995 0.091 < 0.0001 
csrr 316 0.631 6.559 < 0.0001 
bsiz 316 1.011 -0.197 > 0.200 
bdil 316 0.901 1.755 < 0.0001 
bgdr 316 0.877 2.181 < 0.0001 
bind 316 1.011 -0.188 > 0.200 
fsiz 316 1.000 -0.003 >0.058 
levg 316 0.452 9.751 < 0.0001 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
 
From Table 8, bsiz, bind and fsiz are insignificant at 5%, meaning that they are 
normally distributed. The rests are not normally distributed. 
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Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
Table 9 shows absence of multicollinearity. Table 10 confirms this.  
Table 10 
Results of Multicollinearity Diagnostic 
Variable Variance IF 1/Variance Inflation 
Factor 
Bsiz 1.71 0.585 
Fsiz 1.67 0.599 
Bind 1.23 0.813 
Levg 1.18 0.849 
Bdil 1.16 0.860 
Bgdr 1.05 0.951 
Mean VIF 1.33  
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
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From Table 4, there is no multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. 
Table 11 
Cameron & Trivedi's breakdown of Information Matrix Check 
sdix 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 49.88 27 0.005 
Skewness 17.10 6 0.009 
Kurtosis 5.54 1 0.019 
Total 72.53 34 0.000 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
csrr 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 62.21 27 0.000 
Skewness 36.03 6 0.000 
Kurtosis 97.37 1 0.000 
Total 195.61 34 0.000 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
Table 11 shows that both models have heteroskedasticity problems with p-value less 
than .05. Therefore, Table 12 is robust because of this problem. 
Table 12 
logistic sdix bsiz bdil bgdr bind fsiz levg, robust 
sdix Odds Ratio Robust Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
bsiz .727 .144 -1.61 0.108 .493 1.072 
bdil .832 .116 -1.32 0.186 .634 1.092 
bgdr .930 .031 -2.17 0.030 .870 .993 
bind .485 .759 -0.46 0.644 .023 10.440 
fsiz 4.595 3.701 1.89 0.058 .948 22.278 
levg .455 .088 -4.07 0.000 .312 .666 
_cons 1481.759 2739.854 3.95 0.000 39.5238 55551.56 
Wald chi2(6)    =      63.98 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudo likelihood = -25.231358                 Pseudo R2       =     0.5055 
Source: Results of stata 13 of data from www.nse.ng 
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From Table 12, it shows that board gender and leverage are significant and have 
positive effects on csrr. The research fails to find board size, meeting (diligence), 
independence and fsiz significant.  
Conclusions 
We add to the level of knowledge by examining board gender and gearing among the 
factors affecting csrr in Nigeria. The results show that more female board of directors 
and enhanced leverage has important contributions to csrr. Two things are clear 
from the results of the study: the appointment of more female board members and 
the use of leverage by firms instead of more equity. This study addresses the issue of 
gender and issue of reducing dilution of control of ownership.  
In terms of board size, a comparative analysis of our results and empirical findings 
suggest that our work is consistent with findings of Xtian et al. (2014), Martin and 
Herrero (2018), Guerro-Villagas et al. (2018), Isa and Sabo (2015) and Naseem et al. 
(2019). However, inconsistent with findings from Abduh and Ageely (2015), Bulto 
(2011) and Jensen (1993). In terms of diligence (meetings), we are consistent with 
the findings of Naseem et al. (2019), and inconsistent with the work of Harywaman et 
al. (2020). In terms of gender, we are consistent with the findings of Isa and Sabo 
(2015), Naseem et al. (2019), Riyadh et al. (2019), Anazonwu et al. (2018), Yaroson 
and Giwa (2016), Bello and Abdul-Manaf (2017), Awodiran and Kareem (2019) and 
Abubakar (2016). Our findings on independence are consistent with findings of 
Abubakar (2016), Bello and Abdul-Manaf (2017), Bansal et al. (2018), Khan et al. 
(2013) and Anazonwu et al. (2018). However, the findings are inconsistent with 
work of Ebimobowei (2017) and Awodiran and Kareem (2019). 
We appreciate that the paper is limited to Nigeria and may not apply to elsewhere or 
everywhere, since Nigeria is a developing country. Corporate social responsibility 
has not taken sufficient roots among corporations in Nigeria, like it had taken firm 
roots in developed economies of USA, UK and EU, therefore, caution must be 
observed. Nonetheless, the findings have policy and performance improvement 
implications. We suggest that managers of corporations should take measures to 
increase female directors in the board, increase firm size and take advantage of cheap 
leverage since both are significant 
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